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INTRODUCTION

Since the enactment of the Judiciary Act
States federal courts have had the authority to
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
agreeable to the usages and principles of law."'

of 1789, United
"issue all writs
jurisdictions and
This authority is

expressly included in what is known as the "All Writs Act" (the
Act).2 The Act was first passed in 1911 and has been amended
several times thereafter? Section 1651 of the Act provides, in its
* Lindsey Young Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of the James
L. Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law at The University ofCTennessee College
of Law. The Author thanks 0. Bart O'Neil for his research assistance on this
Article and Nancy B. Rapoport for her comments on early drafts.

1. 28U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).
2. Id.
3. All Writs Act, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1087, 1134 (1911) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1651).
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current form, that "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law." 4 Traditionally, federal circuit courts of appeal
and the Supreme Court have used the Act as statutory authority for
appellate review, and federal district courts have used it to aid in the
establishment of original jurisdiction.5 The Act has also been used
as a basis for issuing a myriad of injunctions and to remove cases
from state court to federal court when removal was not proper under
6
any other statutory authority.
Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) grants
bankruptcy courts, traditionally viewed as courts of equity, "broad
authority" to accomplish the overriding goals of bankruptcy law and
oversee the proper functioning of the Code, which "includ[es] the
7
ability to modify the relationships between debtors and creditors.",
Courts have noted that Section 105 can fill in gaps and ambiguities
in the Code. 8 Bankruptcy courts, unlike federal courts in civil cases,
have relied on this authority to craft an "enormous array of orders. ' 9
Parties to a bankruptcy proceeding often rely on Section 105(a) of
the Code "as a means of enlisting the aid of judicial authority
whenever the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly address a
10
particular situation."
Perhaps the most widespread use of [Section] 105 has
been in the area of injunctive relief in situations such
as an extension of the automatic stay to nondebtor
parties, the substantive consolidation of separate
business entities, and the direction for third parties to
4. 28 U.S.C. § 165 1(a).
5. Lonny S. Hoffman, Traditional and NontraditionalUses of the All Writs
Act, 28 U.S.C § 1651(a), by Federal Courts in Civil Cases, ALI CLE COURSE OF
STUDY MATERIALS: CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION TECHNIQUES 1N FEDERAL
AND STATE COURTS 819, 821 (2002).

6. See id. at 832-37 (collecting cases).
7. Michael D. Sousa, EquitablePowers of a Bankruptcy Court: FederalAll
Writs Act and § 105 of the Code Part1, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 38 (2006).

8. See, e.g., In re Ockerlund Constr. Co., 308 B.R. 325, 330 (Bankr. N.D.
111. 2004) ("The Bankruptcy Court's equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)
... fill[s] in gaps and ambiguities ...
9. Sousa, supra note 7, at 38.
10. Id.
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either affirmatively act or refrain from taking a
prescribed course of action.1 '
Some criticize the bankruptcy courts' willing use of Section 105 as a
means of resolving conflict when the Code provides no solution on
an issue before the court or a solution under the principles of equity
and bankruptcy law." That criticism, however, is not the focus of
this Article.
This Article compares and contrasts the differences in the use
of the "all writs" authority that is granted to federal district courts
and bankruptcy courts by the two respective statutes. Historically,
federal district courts seem reluctant to invoke the authority granted
by the all writs act except under certain limited circumstances. On
the contrary, bankruptcy courts seem much more willing to invoke
the bankruptcy equivalent of the all writs act in a variety of
circumstances. This Article comments on federal district courts' and
bankruptcy courts' divergent uses of the all writs doctrine and
attempts to provide an explanation for these differences in usage.
II.

ALL WRITS IN DISTRICT COURTS

A.

Injunctive Relief

Federal district courts most commonly invoke their all writs
power to aid in the establishment of original jurisdiction. 3 The most
common method federal district courts employ to establish original

11. Sousa, supra note 7, at 38.
12. See generally Lynne F. Riley & Maria C. Furlong, The Supreme Court
Restores Discretion and Enhances Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Courts, 2008
NORTON ANN. SURv. BANKR. L. 4 (2008) (explaining that there is "a growing

body of academia that examines the historical underpinnings of the bankruptcy
court as a basis for disputing the court's status as a court of equity, Proponents of
this theory profess strict limitations on the bankruptcy court's discretion to utilize
equitable and inherent powers whenever the Bankruptcy Code is silent, vague, or
contradictory").

13. See Hoffman, supra note 5, at 831 (stating that district courts most often
use Section 1651(a) to establish original jurisdiction in support of injunctive
relief.
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jurisdiction is the issuance of injunctive relief.' 4 Although there are
no specific procedures for seeking the issuance of a writ from the
district courts, there are several examples in which a federal district
court has done so. For example, in Blue Cross of California v.
SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc., the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut asserted injunctive
relief that barred plaintiffs from bringing claims in a state court
because the federal court already issued judgment on a majority of
the claims.1 5 In Blue Cross, a number of healthcare insurers sued
SmithKline in federal court.t6 The court ultimately dismissed a
majority of the insurers' claims, and, shortly thereafter, a substantial
number of the plaintiffs in the federal suit filed an action in an
Illinois state court, asserting claims that were essentially identical to
those dismissed by the federal district court.17 The district court
ultimately issued a final judgment for the defendant on the remaining
claims in the federal court, after which the defendant sought an
injunction to block the on-going action in the Illinois state court.1 8
The federal court sided with the defendant, granted the motion, and
emphasized that there was a prior federal judgment on identical
claims. 9 Further, the federal court concluded that the federal and
state actions were based on the same allegations of fraud, and that
the doctrine of res judicata, therefore, supported issuance of the
injunction. 20 Additionally, for the claims pending in the lflinois state
court to which the doctrine of res judicata did not apply, the federal
21
court invoked its all writs authority and issued an injunction.
According to the federal court, the risk of "duplicative and
inconsistent" orders from different courts justified enjoining
prosecution by plaintiffs in the state court of the claims that were

14. See Hoffman, supra note 5, at 832-33 (discussing cases in which federal
district courts have used the All Writs Act to "in aid of their original jurisdiction,
to support issuance of injunctive relief').
15. 108 F,Supp. 2d 130, 132 (D,Coun. 2000).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.at 136.
20. Id.
21. Blue Cross, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 137.
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originally asserted in the federal action, as well as those not asserted
22
by plaintiffs in the federal action.
Federal district courts have also issued injunctions extending
to non-parties under their all writs authority. For example, in In re
BankAmerica Corp. Securities Litigation, following the merger of
BankAmerica and NationsBank, two dozen class actions were filed
in six federal district courts.23 Seven other class actions were filed in
California state courts at virtually the same time. 24 Despite the
variance in geography, each of the class actions included essentially
identical claims against identical defendants.2 5 The federal claims
were consolidated, and, after some of the plaintiffs in the newly
consolidated action became aware that they would not be the lead
plaintiffs in the consolidated action, those plaintiffs withdrew from
the federal action, preferring to litigate in state court.2 6 The federal
court subsequently enjoined the state court proceedings over
counsel's objection that the state plaintiffs were not parties to the
federal action.2 7 The federal court maintained that its all writs
authority "extends, under appropriate circumstances, to persons who,
though not parties to the originalaction or engaged in wrongdoing,
of a court order or
are in a position to frustrate the implementation
28
justice.
of
the proper administration
Another instance in which a federal court issued an
injunction under its all writs power to stop duplicative litigation and
to prevent an attempt to circumvent a prior judgment is Phillips
Beverage Co. v. Belvedere, S.A. 29 In Belvedere,3" Phillips was
accused of importing counterfeit Belvedere products and patent
infringement. 3 Belvedere's application for a temporary restraining
order was denied in federal court.3 2 Unsatisfied with the ruling of
the district court, Belvedere sought relief from the United States
22. Blue Cross, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 137.
23. 95 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1046 (ED. Mo. 2000).
24. Id.
25. Id.

26. Id.
27. Id. at 1048.

28. Id.
29. 204 F.3d 805, 806 (8th Cir. 2000).

30. Id.
31. Id. at 805.
32. Id. at 805 06.
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Customs Service by recording its purported copyright in the product
and requesting a customs order to detain the allegedly counterfeit
and patent-infringing products.3 3 Philips returned to federal court
and obtained an injunction prescribing withdrawal of the application
pending before Customs. 34 The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that
the applicant tried "to make an end run around the district court's
refusal to grant the interim relief... in a case over which the district
court continued to have jurisdiction by going back to Customs and
35
asking Customs to do what the district court would not."
B.

Removal Jurisdiction

Federal courts have also used their all writs power as an
independent basis for removal jurisdiction. The Second Circuit was
the first circuit court to approve the use of all writs as an independent
basis for removal in Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers.36
After Yonkers, numerous district courts have agreed, at least in
theory, with the Second Circuit. 37

However, the Supreme Court

33. Belvedere, 204 F.3d at 805-06.
34. id. at 806.
35. id.
36. See Hoffman, supra note 5, at 833 (discussing Yonkers Racing Corp. v.
City of Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855 (2d Cir 1988)).
37. See id. at 833-36 ("Since the Yonkers decision, on more than thirty
occasions, in published opinions, federal district and circuit courts have considered
the question of whether to uphold removal of a state case on the basis of the All
Writs Act as an independent source of removal authority ....[and n]early every
court which has considered this question has concluded that the All Writs Act may
serve as an independent basis for removal."); accord In re Texas, 110 F. Supp. 2d
514, 527 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (noting that a "a federal court may employ the All Writs

Act to remove an otherwise unremovable action"); Keeling v. Kronick, Moskovitz,
Tiedemann & Girard, No. Civ. JFM-00- 133, 2000 WL 708945 (D. Md. May 11,
2000) (finding that the All Writs Act was the basis for removal and the court
retained jurisdiction over certain matters); Holden v. Connex-Metalna Mgmt.
Consulting, No. Civ. A. 98-3326, 1999 WL 1072549 (E.D. La. Nov. 24, 1999)
(finding that although the All Writs Act may support removal, there was
insufficient justification for removal); First Union Nat'l Bank v. Frempong, No.
99-1434, 1999 WL 376021 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 1999), aff'd, 208 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.
2000) (recognizing that defendants can invoke the court's power under the All
Writs Act, but the defendants failed to present circumstances justifying removal);
Raggio v. Omega Inst., Inc., No. 98-CV-2782, 1998 WL 377904 (D.N.J. July 2,
1998) (recognizing a district court may invoke its power under the All Writs Act,
but the defendant did not present an exceptional circumstance that required
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effectively ended this practice in 2002.
In Syngenta Crop
Protection, Inc. v. Henson, Chief Justice Rehnquist, on behalf of a
unanimous Court, rejected an attempt to independently justify
removal under the Act. 38 Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Act does
not, "by its specific terms, provide federal courts with an
independent grant of jurisdiction," and, therefore, a district court
cannot use its all writs authority under the Act to exercise removal
jurisdiction.3 9
C.

Contempt and the All Writs Act

The broad language of the Act begs the question: Does the
Act authorize sanctions for contempt? Though a plain language
reading of the Act seems to support the notion that contempt
sanctions are appropriate under the Act, the Fifth Circuit reached a
different conclusion.40 In ITT Community Development Corp. v.
Barton, ITT sued Barton, alleging various causes of action at law,

and brought an action in equity for the imposition of a constructive
removal); Lucas v. Planning Bd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 310, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("There
is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction in the authority conferred by the All
Writs Act."); N.Y. State Laborers Political Action Comm. v. Mason Tenders Dist.
Council of Greater N.Y., No. 97-CV-1731, 1998 WL 146248 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,
1998) (finding that the All Writs Act provides for an independent basis for
removal); Gehm v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 992 F. Supp. 209 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(deciding that the district court did not have authority under the All Writs Act to
remove an action from state court); Chance v. Sullivan, 993 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.
Tex. 1998) (holding the All Writs Act gave the federal district court the authority
to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over state claims that question a settlement
approved by the court); 35 Acres Assocs. v. Adams, 962 F. Supp. 687 (D.V.I.
1997) (noting that removal under the All Writs Act is inappropriate for actions that
do not concern class action litigation or complex consent decrees); Harbor
Venture, Inc. v. Nichols, 934 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating the court was
persuaded that the case was removable under the All Writs Act); Holmes v.
Trustmark Nat'l Bank, No. l:95cv323GR, 1996 WL 904513, at *2 (S.D. Miss.
1996) (noting that "'[tjhe All-Writs Act allows a federal court to issue an
injunction against actions in state court' (alteration in original) (quoting In re
Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. 648, 656 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990))).
38. 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002).
39. Id. at 33.
40. Although this case was tried in the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit in
Bonner v. City of Prichard adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the
former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981. 661 F.2d 1206, 1209
(I1th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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trust. 41 ITT then moved to hold Barton in criminal contempt for
allegedly obstructing justice through a series of fraudulent transfers
calculated to remove his funds from the reach of the district court's
process.4 2 The district court scheduled a show-cause hearing and
ordered Barton's attorneys, who had custody of some of the funds, to
deposit these funds in the court registry.43 However, the attorneys
44
did not deposit the funds by the date of the show-cause hearing.
The district court held the attorneys in civil contempt, and the
attorneys appealed. 45 The Fifth Circuit held that neither the Act nor
the inherent powers doctrine authorized the district court to hold the
attorneys in contempt.46 According to the circuit court, the Act only
authorized the district court to issue orders necessary to protect its
subject matter jurisdiction:
As we perceive it, the All Writs Act could
have served as authority for the turn-over order here
in question only to curb conduct which threatened
improperly to impede or defeat the subject matter
jurisdiction then being exercised by the court.
Conversely, conduct not shown to be detrimental to
the court's jurisdiction or exercise thereof could not
have been enjoined under the Act. Thus, in the case
at hand, for the turn-over order to have validity, it
must be shown that it was directed at conduct which,
left unchecked, would have had the practical effect of
diminishing the court's power to bring the litigation to
a natural conclusion.47
Because ITT "made no showing that the issuance of a
tm-over order was necessary to enable the court to try the [lawsuit]
to final judgment," the Act did not authorize contempt sanctions.48
This is not to say that federal courts lack the power to punish through
41. 569 F.2d 1351, 1353 n.2, 1357 n.13 (5th Cir. 1978).
42. Id. at 1354.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1355.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1354.
47. ITT, 569 F.2d at 1359 (citations omitted).
48. Id-
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contempt. In fact, it is well settled that the federal courts have
inherent power to punish for contempt4---a power that reaches both
50
conduct before the court and conduct beyond the court's confines,
and which the court may exercise even after the action in which the
contempt arose is terminated. 51 However, ITT makes clear that the
inherent contempt power of the federal courts does not arise from the
Act.

III.

52

ALL WRITS IN BANKRUPTCY COURT

Bankruptcy courts, like district courts, have the ability to
issue all writs "necessary or appropriate" in aid of their jurisdiction.
The Code's all writs provision provides: The court may issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry

out the provisions of this title." 53 Additionally, when Congress
replaced the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 with the Code in 1978, it

arguably made the Act applicable to bankruptcy courts.5 4 However,
whether this grant of power is constitutional, and whether
bankruptcy courts do in fact possess the ability to grant equitable
relief under the Act and Section 105(a), both remain unclear.55 It is
49. E.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (suggesting that
"it is firmly established that '[tihe power to punish for contempts is inherent in all
courts"' (alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
505, 510 (1874))); United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 704
(1988) (arguing that a federal court has "inherent authority to punish disobedience
and vindicate its authority"); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 327
(1904) (reasoning that contempt proceedings are important for federal courts in
order to "uphold the power of the court" and to "secure to suitors therein the rights
by it awarded").
50. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44.
51. In re E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.-Benlate Litig., 99 F.3d 363, 368
( lth Cir. 1996).
52. ITT,569 F.2dat 1360.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012),
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 451 (2012) (defining the phrase "court of the United
States" in the Act to include all district courts).
55. In one of his articles, Michael D. Sousa provides detailed inquiry into the
question of whether a bankruptcy court has the power to craft equitable relief
under the All Writs Act independent of Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code and, if
so, in what manner and to what extent a bankruptcy court today can use the All
Writs Act to fashion equitable relief. Michael D. Sousa, The Equitable Powers of
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also possible that bankruptcy courts would not possess any
additional authority under the Act that the courts did not already
possess under Section 105(a). Even if this is the case, bankruptcy
courts have found little difficulty finding justification for their
actions under Section 105(a).57
A.

Section 105 and the Rights of Third Parties

Most are well aware of the protections afforded to the debtor
The
estate immediately upon filing a bankruptcy petition.
''automatic stay," which provides the debtor protection from
creditor's attempts at collecting on debt immediately after filing, is
perhaps the best-known debtor protection in the Code.58 Although
the stay of section 362 clearly applies to the debtor, courts have used
Section 105(a) to, among other things, provide third parties (who
have not filed for protection under the Code) "both temporary stays

a Bankruptcy Court: Are § 105 of the Code and the FederalAll Writs Act Mutually
Exclusive?, 2007 NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 5 (2007). Sousa concludes that
the creation of the bankruptcy courts is the result of an "Act of Congress" because
the All Writs Act specifically provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law,"
and bankruptcy courts are created under Article I of the Constitution pursuant to
Congress's substantive authority over the law of bankruptcies. Id. Accordingly,
the bankruptcy courts may use the All Writs Act as well as Section 105 of the
Code in fashioning equitable relief. Id. Sousa argues, however, that "the
parameters of the All Writs Act and [Section] 105 should be applied differently."
Id. That is, a bankruptcy court should attempt to utilize Section 105 of the Code in
the first instance in granting relief, so long as the remedy sought can be attributed
to carrying out the provisions of the Code. Id. If the remedy cannot be tied to a
provision of the Code, then subsequently a bankruptcy court should be able to
utilize the All Writs Act, such as in situations when enjoining ongoing state court
litigation is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court or to help
prevent the devolution of the reorganization process. Id.
56. Riley & Furlong, supra note 12.
57. See Steve H. Nickles & David G. Epstein, Another Way of Thinking
About Section 105(a) and Other Sources of Supplemental Law Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 3 CHAP. L. Rav. 7, 8 (2000) ("Section 105 of the Bankruptcy
Code has been cited in thousands of reported cases as an authority to support a
wide variety of judicial decisions and actions.").
58. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
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Courts have
from collection and permanent releases of liability."59
also used Section 105(a) to cross-collateralize loans of undersecured
creditors. 60 For example, in In re Aldan Industries, Inc., the
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated that
the court had the authority to issue nondebtor stays, despite choosing
not to stay arbitration proceedings in that case. 61 Of course, such
actions by bankruptcy courts have been criticized. 62 However, in
Aldan and similar cases, bankruptcy courts seem motivated to restrict
the rights of third parties-primarily to protect the debtor against any
substantial threat likely to eliminate the possibility of reorganization.
In the plan context, bankruptcy courts have used Section
105(a) to justify the inclusion of nondebtor releases or restructuring

59. Daniel B. Bogart, Resisting the Expansion of Bankruptcy Court Power
Under Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code: The All Writs Act and an Admonition
from ChiefJusticeMarshall, 35 ARuz. ST. L.J. 793, 794 (2003).
60. Id.
61. No. 00-10360DWS, 2000 WL 357719, at *9 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Apr. 3,
2000). See also In re Optical Techs., Inc., 216 B.R. 989, 993-94 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1997) ("Some courts have taken the position that the plain language of Section
524(e), however, provides only that a discharge does not affect the liability of third
parties and does not restrain the power of the bankruptcy court to otherwise grant a
release to a third party. This interpretation is consistent with the language of
Section 105 which is broadly written and allows all orders necessary to effectuate
a reorganization. . . ." (citation omitted)); Robins v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
Civ. A. No. 93-0063-H, 1994 WL 149597, at *3 (W.D. Va. Apr. 4, 1994)
(affirming the authority of the court to enter a nondebtor stay but declining to do
so on other grounds); In re F.T.L., Inc., 152 B.R. 61 (Bankr. E.D. Va 1993)
(enjoining collection actions against officers of debtor car wash company); In re
Heron, 148 B.R. 660, 687 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) ("Section 524(e) contains no
language of prohibition and should not be interpreted to limit the court's power
under § 105(a).").
62. Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A
CriticalReappraisalof Nondebtor Releases in Chapter II Reorganizations, 1997
U. ILL. L. REv. 959, 1080 (1997) ("This article has argued that the bankruptcy
courts' practice of discharging creditor actions against non-debtors is an abusive
one, with no redeeming theoretical merit.
Policy concerns advanced by
proponents of non-debtor releases seem designed primarily to obfuscate the
redistributional consequences of these liability releases.
Most bewildering,
though, is the fact that authority to issue these exceptional injunctions has been
manufactured out of whole cloth, and in disregard of Supreme Court precedent
prohibiting them.").
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provisions in Chapter 11 reorganization plans.6 3 Nondebtor releases
may be classified as estate releases, third-party releases, or
exculpations. Bankruptcy courts are permitted to issue estate
releases-releases of claims held by the debtor against a nondebtor
third party-in accordance with Section 1123(b)(3)(A) of the
Code.6 4 Third-party releases-releases of a nondebtor third party's
claim against another nondebtor third party-can be classified as
either consensual or nonconsensual.65 Bankruptcy courts have the
authority to grant consensual releases, but whether they have the
authority to grant nonconsensual releases is currently the subject of66a
circuit split in interpreting Sections 524(e) and 105(a) of the Code.
Exculpation, the release of claims by both debtor and nondebtor third
parties of claims against professionals and other fiduciaries of the
bankruptcy estate, appears permissible pursuant to Section 1103(c)
of the Code. 67 In Travelers Indemnity Company v. Bailey, the
Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to answer the
question of whether bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to release
nondebtors from claims of other nondebtors that have no impact
upon, and are not derived from, the res of the bankruptcy estate.68
Instead of reaching the question, however, the Court, in an opinion
authored by Justice Souter and joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, disposed of the case under the
principles of res judicata and the bar on collaterally attacking a final

63. George W, Kuney, Nondebtor Releases and Travelers v. Bailey: A
Circuit Split That Is Likely to Remain, 2010 NORTON ANN, SURV. OF BANKR. L. 5

(2010).
64. See infra Part III(B) (discussing "estate releases").
65. Jason W. Harbour & Tara L. Elgie, The 20-Year Split: Nonconsensual
Nondebtor Releases, 21 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 4 (2012), available on
Westlaw at 21 J.Bankr. L. & Prac. 4 Art. 4 (discussing "permissibility of
nonconsensual nondebtor releases . . . [and] what constitutes consent for
consensual nondebtor releases").
66. See infra Part 111(D) (discussing "nonconsensual third party releases");
see also Harbour & Elgie, supra note 65 (discussing the circuit split and the cases
involved in detail).
67. See In re Pac, Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 253 (5th Cir. 2009) ("We agree,
however, with courts that have held that II US.C. § 1103(c), which lists the
creditors' committee's powers, implies committee members have qualified
immunity for actions within the scope of their duties.") (collecting cases).
68. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 152 (2009).
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order without opining on the scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction or the
propriety of nondebtor releases.6 9
B.

Estate Releases

Debtors are permitted to release their claims against specified
nondebtor third parties as part of the reorganization plan pursuant to
Section 1123(b)(3)(A), which provides that "a plan may provide for
the settlement or adjustment of any claim or interest belonging to the
debtor or to the estate." 70 In evaluating estate releases, courts
generally apply the same standard as applied under Bankruptcy Rule
9019.71 Bankruptcy Rule 9019 provides that "on motion by the
trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a
compromise or settlement., 7 2 A court may approve an estate release
if it determines that the release is "fair, equitable, and in the best
73
interests of the estate."
Courts typically use these seven factors, or a similar
variation, in determining whether an estate release is appropriate:
(1) balance between the litigation's possibility of success and the
settlement's future benefits; (2) the likelihood of complex and
protracted litigation and its attendant expense, inconvenience, and
delay, including the difficulty in collecting the judgment; (3)
interests of the creditors, including the affected class's relative
benefits and creditor support; (4) whether other parties in interest
support the plan; (5) counsel's competency and experience and
judge's knowledge in reviewing the plan; (6) the nature and breadth
of the releases; and (7) 74extent to which the plan is the product of
arm's-length bargaining.

69. Bailey, 557 U.S. at 151-54. The question was also presented to the Court
in the next term in Ad Hoe Committee of Kenton County Bondholders v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., this time in the form of a request for direct review. 558 U.S. 1007
(2009). The Court denied certiorari without comment, however. Id.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(A) (2012).
71. In re Coram Healtheare Corp., 315 B.R. 321, 334 (Bankr. D, Del. 2004)
(citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019).
72. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).
73. In re Dewey & Lebouef LLP, 478 B.R. 627, 640 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
74. In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 462 (2d Cir. 2007); see also
In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., 960 F.2d 285, 292-93 (2d Cir. 1992)
(affirming the bankruptcy court's approval of a settlement due to the complexity of
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Consensual Third-PartyReleases

Courts have found that third-party releases against
nondebtors (such as officers, directors, affiliates, parent companies,
and guarantors) in a plan approved by creditors do not violate the
Code; those creditors who vote in favor of the plan are deemed to
have consented to the releases and are, therefore, bound by them.75
While bankruptcy courts are authorized to grant consensual
releases, it is unclear whether declining to accept a plan on a ballot
that provides the opportunity to opt-out of a nondebtor release
constitutes sufficient consent to bind that party to the release. When
the ballots allow voters to opt-out of the release, and the parties
received adequate notice that abstaining from voting and declining to
opt-out would result in granting the nondebtor releases, bankruptcy
courts within the Second and Fourth Circuits have deemed parties
that abstain and decline to opt-out to have consented to the
releases. 76 Courts within the Third Circuit, however, have held that
entities that abstained from voting and declined to opt-out did not
consent to nondebtor releases, notwithstanding the fact that the
77
ballots provided notice and an opportunity to opt-out of the release.

the claimants' litigation, the defendant's limited funds for recovery, and the
potential for the fund's depletion as a consequence of ongoing litigation).
75. See In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1993)
("[C]ourts have found releases that are consensual and non-coercive to be in
accord with the strictures of the Bankruptcy Code."); In re Spansion, Inc., 426
B.R. 114, 144 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) ("Courts have determined that a third party
release may be included in a plan if the release is consensual and binds only those
creditors voting in favor of the plan."); In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 111
(Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (noting that in order to accomplish a third-party release, the
"affirmative agreement of the creditor affected" is necessary).
76. See In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 419 B.R. 179, 218 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(holding that parties who abstain from voting, and who do not opt out, release the
claims consensually); In re Calpine Corp., No. 05-60200, 2007 WL 4565223, at
*10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2007) (consenting to release where parties declined
to opt out).
77. See In re Washington Mut., Inc., 442 B.R. 314, 355 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011)
(holding that "the opt out mechanism is not sufficient to support the third party
releases . . . [and flailing to return a ballot is not a sufficient manifestation of

consent to a third party release"); In re Coram Healthcare Corp., 315 B.R. 321
(Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (treating entities that abstained from voting as
non-consenting creditors for purposes of post-petition interest).
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Nonconsensual Third-PartyReleases

Currently, the circuit courts are split on the issue of whether
bankruptcy courts are authorized to issue nonconsensual releases of
78
nondebtor third parties as part of the debtor's reorganization plan.
This split is a consequence of conflicting interpretations of Sections
524(e) and 105(a) of the Code. Section 524(e) provides that the
"discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any
79
other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt."

Again, Section

105(a) grants broad equitable power to the

bankruptcy courts to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is
80
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title."
However, the Third Circuit has found that Section 105(a) "does not
authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are
otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving
commission to do equity."'" That said, Section 105 has been, and
remains, a tool used to justify many remedies that are not specifically
82
provided for by the Code.
The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits prohibit nonconsensual
nondebtor releases.8 3 These circuits interpret Section 524(e) as
preserving claims against nondebtor third parties, concluding that its
specific provisions "displace the court's equitable powers under
Section 105 to order the permanent relief [against a non-debtor]
sought by [the debtor]. 84 These courts found the fact that Congress
78. Harbour & Elgie, supra note 65.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012).

80. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
81. In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc-, 391 F.3d 190, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).
82. See infra Part III(F) (discussing the application of Section 105 when no
other remedy exists).
83. See In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d 229, 252 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that
applicable case law broadly forecloses nonconsensual nondebtor releases); In re
Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the argument that
Section 105 gives bankruptcy courts the power to discharge the liabilities of
nondebtors); In re Zale Corp., 62 F.3d 746, 760 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that
Section 105 injunctions that discharge nondebtors must be overturned); In re W.
Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592, 598 (10th Cir. 1990) (reversing the
bankruptcy court's decision to replace a debtor's contingency fee obligation with
its own determination of a lower hourly fee).
84. In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1402 (alteration in original) (quoting In re
Am. Hardwoods, Inc., 885 F.2d 621, 625-26 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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amended Section 524 to add Section 524(g), which authorized
bankruptcy courts to impose a channeling injunction for nondebtors
in mass asbestos cases, to further support the position that "Congress
provided explicit authority to bankruptcy courts to issue injunctions
in favor of the third parties in an extremely limited class of cases
[and] reinforces the conclusion that [Section] 524(e) denies such
' 85
authority in other, non-asbestos cases."
The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits interpret
Sections 524(e) and 105(a) to be reconcilable. These circuits
interpret Section 105(a) to confer broad equitable power on
bankruptcy courts, and find that the language of Section 524(e)
which provides that a "discharge of a debt ... does not affect the
liability of [third parties]," 86 does not "purport to limit or restrain the
power of the bankruptcy court" to grant nondebtor third-party
releases when appropriate in limited circumstances.87 Although
these courts agree that Section 524(e) does not prohibit
nonconsensual third-party releases, they use different standards to
determine when it is appropriate to issue a release.
Courts in the Second Circuit have stated that they are
reluctant to approve nonconsensual third-party releases both because
Section 524(g), the only explicit authority for granting them in the
Code, is limited to asbestos cases and because releases are
susceptible to abuse since they "may operate as a bankruptcy
discharge arranged without a filing and without the safeguards of the
Code."88 Courts in the Second Circuit permit nondebtor releases
render
only when there is a "finding that truly unusual circumstances
89
plan."
the
of
success
the
the release terms important to
85. In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1402 n.6; see also In re W. Real Estate
Fund, 922 F.2d at 600 (considering a permanent injunction precluding the debtor's
former attorney's attempt to recover the unpaid portion of his fee from the settling
party and holding that the plan's provision was improper based on Section 524(e)'s
express language demonstrating that "Congress did not intend to extend
[discharge] to third-party bystanders").
86, 11 U.S.C. § 524(e).
87. E.g., In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1993)
(arguing that the language of Section 524(e) "does not purport to limit or restrain
the power of the bankruptcy court to otherwise grant a release to a third party").
88. In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 2005).
89. Id. at 143. In In re Drexel, which involved a settlement agreement
between classes of securities claimants and a bankrupt securities brokerage firm,
the court upheld a nonconsensual nondebtor release after finding that an injunction
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By comparison, the Fourth Circuit identified four factors
relevant to deciding whether a nonconsensual release is proper: (1)
the claimants overwhelmingly approve the plan; (2) the plan
provides for full payment of the creditor's claims; (3) the injunction
affects a very small percentage of the total claimants; and 90(4) the
injunction is essential to the debtor's effective reorganization.
Next, the Sixth Circuit permits the release of nonconsensual
nondebtor claims in unusual circumstances, as determined by
evaluating seven factors: (1) an identity of interests between the
debtor and the third party, such that suit against the nondebtor will
deplete the assets of the estate; (2) substantial contribution to the
reorganization by the nondebtor; (3) whether the release is essential
to the reorganization; (4) overwhelming acceptance of the plan by
the affected class; (5) whether the plan provides payment to the
affected class; (6) whether those claimants who choose not to settle
factual
are able to fully recover under the plan; and (7) specific
91
conclusion.
its
support
to
court
bankruptcy
the
findings by
limiting the number of lawsuits that could be brought against Drexel's former
directors and officers was important to the success of the plan-without it, the
directors and officers would have been less likely to reach the settlement
agreement, which was "an essential element of Drexel's ultimate reorganization."
960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992).
90. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 701-02 (4th Cir. 1989). In In re
A.H. Robins, which involved mass tort litigation resulting from petition claims, the
plan enjoined suits against nondebtor third parties, including directors, attorneys,
and insurance companies. Id. at 701. The plan included a settlement, but some
claimants chose to opt-out of it in order to pursue their claims against insurers or
other third parties. Id. at 701 02. Because the plan was overwhelmingly
approved, provided a settlement allowing claimants to recover, and "the entire
reorganization hinge[dJ on the debtor being free from indirect claims such as suits
against parties who would have indemnity or contribution claims against the
debtor," the court upheld the releases, Id. at 702.
91. In re Dow Coming Corp., 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002). Applying
the In re Dow Corning test, a bankruptcy court did not approve the release of
donors claims against the debtor-non-profit's directors and officers: (1) there was
an identity of interests between the debtor and nondebtor officers and directors due
to the near certainty of lawsuits against them, their rights to indemnification, and
the advancement of legal expenses; (2) the fact that the officers and directors
performed their duties was not sufficient because they performed them either for
payment or to satisfy a fiduciary duty; (3) the possibility of officers and directors
leaving the company did not make the releases essential; (4) although the creditors
voted overwhelmingly in favor of the plan, the impacted class did not; (5) the plan
did not provide any mechanism for the payment of affected claims; (6) as it was,
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Finally, the Seventh Circuit has held that bankruptcy courts
have broad equitable power to issue third-party releases so long as
doing so is appropriate and not inconsistent with another provision of
the Code.9 2 The court based this conclusion both on the prior
version of Section 524(e), which states that "[t]he liability of a
person who is a co-debtor with, or guarantor or in any manner a
surety for, a bankrupt shall not be altered by the discharge of such
bankrupt," and where Congress intends to specifically limit the
bankruptcy court's power, it has done so clearly-Section 105 states
93
that "a court may not appoint a receiver in a case under this title."
The First, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have not addressed the
statutory conflict directly, but have issued decisions permitting the
issuance of nondebtor releases. 94 In In re Munford, Inc., the
Eleventh Circuit considered an adversary proceeding in which the
debtor alleged a breach of professional duty regarding a leverage
buyout by a valuation firm. 95 The court held that Section 105(a) and
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supported the
bankruptcy court's decision to enter an order barring non-settling
defendants from claims of contribution and indemnity against the
the release provisions' purpose to protect the nondebtor parties from any of the
affected party's claims precluded recovery from third-party sources outside of the
plan; (7) the only factor weighing in favor of approving the release was the
potential for an obligation to indemnify the officers and directors, which "cannot
by itself justify the Release Provisions." In re Nat'l Heritage Found., Inc., 478
B.R. 216, 231 32 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012).
92. In re Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc., 519 F.3d 640, 657 (7th Cir. 2008).
93. Id. at 656 n.4 (quoting II U.S.C. § 34 (1976) (repealed Oct. 1, 1979); 11
U.S.C. § 105 (2006)). In Airadigm, the court approved a plan providing for the
release of a third-party creditor from liability for any act or omission connected
with the plan other than willful misconduct as it found the release to be appropriate
and necessary to the reorganization: It was limited only to claims arising out of the
reorganization; the limitation was subject to the plan's other provisions, e.g., one
that expressly reserved the FCC's regulatory powers, preventing the nondebtor
from "skirting the FCC's regulations"; and the bankruptcy's evidence was
adequate that the nondebtor required the limitation before it would provide
requisite financing, "which was itself essential to the reorganization ....
Absent
[the nondebtor's] involvement, the reorganization simply would not have
occurred." ld. at 657.
94. Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 977 (1st Cir. 1995);
In re Munford, Inc., 97 F.3d 449, 454 (1 lth Cir. 1996); In re AOV Indus., Inc.,
792 F.2d 1140, 1145-46 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
95. 97 F.3d at 452.
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valuation firm: "Section 105(a) clearly provides that the bankruptcy
court can enter 'any order' necessary to carry out the provisions of
of special
the Bankruptcy Code, while Rule 16 authorizes the use
96
procedures to assist the parties in reaching a settlement.,
It is unclear whether the nonconsensual release of nondebtor
third parties is permitted in the Third Circuit. In In re Continental
Airlines, the court held that when the plaintiffs received no
consideration for having their claims permanently enjoined, the
bankruptcy court's factual findings were insufficient to establish the
reorganization was fair and necessary-the "hallmarks of
permissible non-consensual releases." 97 Subsequently, in In re
Combustion Engineering, the court considered nonconsensual
nondebtor releases proposed to the bankruptcy court as channeling
injunctions under Section 524(g), but the court approved the releases
as equitable injunctions under Section 105(a) after concluding that
Section 524(g) did not authorize a channeling injunction over
98
independent, non-derivative third-party actions against nondebtors.
The Third Circuit refused to approve the Section 105(a) injunction
on the basis that it "would violate [Section] 524(g)(4)(A), would
improperly extend bankruptcy relief to non-debtors, and would
jeopardize the interests of future . , . claimants" of the nondebtor
affiliates. 99 It further held that Section 105(a) "does not authorize
the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise
unavailable under applicable law" ' 0 and opposed the injunction as
its practical effect was to allow the nondebtors to "cleanse
themselves of non-derivative asbestos liability without enduring the
These decisions suggest that
rigors of bankruptcy."' 0 1
nonconsensual nondebtor releases are not permissible in the Third
Circuit.

96. In re Munford, 97 F.3d at 455 (citing

FED. R. Civ. P. 16).
97. 203 F.3d 203, 213 14 (3d Cir. 2000).
98. 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2004).
99. Id. at 234,
100. Id. at 236 (quoting In re Aquatic Dev. Group, Inc., 352 F.3d 671,
680-81 (2d Cir, 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id. at 237.
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Treatment of Critical Vendors Under Sections 105
and 363

In the preplan context, some courts have held that Section
105, coupled with Section 363 (use, sale, or lease of estate property),
authorizes the payment of the unsecured prepetition claims of so
10 2
called "critical vendors" based upon the "doctrine of necessity."'
In In re Tropical SportswearInternational,the Bankruptcy Court for
the Middle District of Florida justified pre-plan payments to a
specific group of creditors by holding that a "bankruptcy court may
utilize [S]ections 105(a) and 363 of the Bankruptcy Code to justify
the grant of critical vendor status under appropriate circumstances.
Bankruptcy courts recognize that [S]ection 363 is a source for
authority to make critical vendor payments, and [S]ection 105 is
used to fill in the blanks."10 3 In re Women First Healthcare, Inc.
provides another example of how courts approach issues stemming
from the use of Section 363: the Delaware Bankruptcy Court held
that Section 105 could not be used as a basis to award an
administrative claim to a stalking horse bidder when a sale order was
rescinded. 4
On the contrary, when a sale did go forward and there was
insufficient disclosure concerning one of the assets that was acquired
in the sale, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Kentucky held that Section 105, coupled with Section 363,
requiring the
authorized the court to enter a remedial order
10 5
purchasing party to pay additional consideration.

102. See In re Tropical Sportswear Int'l Corp., 320 B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 2005) ("[Tlhe Court will exercise its authority pursuant to [S]ections
105 and 363 of the Bankruptcy Code to issue orders providing for the payment of
pre-petition amounts to critical vendors only if. . . the payments are necessary to
the reorganization process .. . ."); In re NVR L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 128 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1992) ("To justify the pre-plan payment of a pre-petition obligation the
proponent of the payment must show substantial necessity. By definition, the
'necessity of payment' rule is a rule of necessity and not one of convenience.").
103. In re TropicalSportswear Int'l Corp., 320 B.R. at 20.
104. 332 B.R. 115, 120 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (awarding a claim under
Section 503(b)(1)(A)).
105. In re LWD, Inc., 332 B.R. 543, 555 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2005), aff'd, 340
B.R. 363 (W.D. Ky. 2006).
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Section 105 When No Other Remedy Exists

Additionally, bankruptcy courts seem particularly willing to
invoke Section 105 to provide a remedy when no remedy would
otherwise exist. Section 105(a), coupled with Section 365(d), has
been employed to authorize retroactive rejection of nonresidential
leases.' 1 6 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in In re At Home
Corp. that the bankruptcy court had equitable authority to approve
rejection of an unexpired nonresidential lease retroactive to the filing
date of the motion to reject. 10 7 At least one court has used Section
105 to authorize the disallowance or surcharge of exemptions
allowed under Section 522 based upon the debtor's post-petition bad
acts-this is contrary, of course, to subsequent Supreme Court
08
precedent on this exact point.
In In re Hoffinger Industries, Inc., the court relied on Section
105 to authorize the re-characterization of a loan from debt to
equity.' ( 9 One court relied on Section 105 to authorize substantive
consolidation of two or more separate debtors." 0 Another court
authorized an equitable credit, through its power under Section 105,
with respect to a Section 549 claim for monies a creditor received
from a debtor post-petition in partial repayment of loans where the
lender advanced money to the debtor and was unaware of the
bankruptcy filing."'

106. In re At Home Corp., 392 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004).
107. Id. at 1072.
108. In re Koss, 319 BR.317, 323 (Bankr. D. Mass, 2005). The subsequent
Supreme Court contrary authority is Law v. Siegel, in which the Court
unanimously held that bankruptcy courts cannot contravene specific provisions of
the Code because that would contradict the principle of statutory construction that
specific prohibitions limit general authority to take action. 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194
(2014).
109. 327 B.R. 389, 408 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005). But cf In re Mirant Corp.,
327 BR. 262, 268-69 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) ("[R]echaracterization of the
Agreements would require exercise by the court of its equitable powers. Yet
bankruptcy courts have been repeatedly instructed to use their equitable powers
sparingly .... Thus, it is not appropriate for the court to entertain at this juncture

the Recharacterization Claim, which should therefore be dismissed." (citations
omitted)).
110. h re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750, 763-64 (9th Cir. 2000).
1ll. In re Cybridge Corp., 312 B.R. 262, 273 (D.N.J. 2004) (relying on
Section 550(d) for support). But cf In re Patterson, 330 B.R. 631, 641 (Bankr.
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Section 105 and the Partial Discharge of Student
Loans

While debtors are provided a variety of discharges in
bankruptcy, Section 523 of the Code provides specific limitations on
the types of debts eligible for discharge. 112 Educational loan
providers who issue loans backed by the federal government are
among a limited class of creditors strongly protected from a
discharge when the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.113 One
notable exception to the immunity from discharge enjoyed by
educational lenders is discharge of the student loan debt when the
'
debtor can show that the loans are an "undue hardship."114
In
essence, the showing of undue hardship is an "all or nothing" affair;
if a debtor is able to show undue hardship under the generally
acceptable standard, then the student loans are discharged, if not,
then the student loans remain.' 15 This generally accepted standard is
E.D. Tenn, 2005) (holding that Section 105 does not allow a defense of equitable
subrogation to a preference claim).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012).
113. Id. § 523(a)(8).
114. Id. What exactly constitutes "undue hardship" has predictably been a
topic of debate. See Robert B. Milligan, Comment, Putting an End to Judicial
Lawmaking: Abolishing the Undue Hardship Exception for Student Loans in
Bankruptcy, 34 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 221, 246-53 (2000) ("[C]ourts applying the
same undue hardship test reach inconsistent results ....
). To evaluate undue
hardship claims, a majority of federal courts have thus applied the three-part test
set forth by the Second Circuit in Brunner v. New York State Higher Education,
831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987). See Jennifer L. Frattini, Comment, The
Dischargeabilityof Student Loans: An Undue Burden?, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 537,
558 n.124 (2001) (collecting cases applying or explicitly adopting the Brunner
test); see also In re Rivers, 213 B.R. 616, 619 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1997) (referring to
Brunner as the "leading authority" on the undue hardship exception). To articulate
undue hardship within the meaning of Section 523(a)(8), the Brunner court
required proof that (1) the debtor cannot currently maintain a minimal standard of
living if forced to repay the loans; (2) this condition is likely to continue
throughout the loan repayment period; and (3) the debtor has made good faith
efforts to repay the loans. Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
115. See In re Brightfrl, 267 F.3d 324, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
the undue hardship test must be strictly construed; if one of the elements is not
proven, the loans cannot be discharged); In re Rifino, 245 F.3d 1083, 1087-88 (9th
Cir. 2001) (holding that a debtor must satisfy all three requirements of the undue
hardship test to be able to discharge the debt); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132,
1137 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that if the debtor's financial hardship is only
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subject to at least one notable exception. In In re Hornsby, the Sixth
Circuit held that, despite the fact that undue hardship justifying
discharge of debtors' student loan debts was not established and total
discharge was not warranted, the bankruptcy court nonetheless had
the power to take action short of total discharge under its authority to
issue orders necessary to carry out provisions of Code, notably
Section 105.16
H.

Section 105 and Contempt

Although the Code does not explicitly provide bankruptcy
courts with civil or criminal contempt powers, it should come as no
surprise that bankruptcy practitioners and judges alike are prone to
believe that a bankruptcy court possesses such power." 7 Some
scholars have argued, and courts have held, that a bankruptcy court
may properly use Section 105 as the source of its contempt order, if
the order is necessary to effectively enforce or use another specific
provision of the Code.1 18 Other scholars, however, have argued that
Section 105 does not provide bankruptcy courts with contempt
powers.' 19 While some courts have held that the contempt power is
temporary, the debtor fails to meet the undue hardship requirement for discharge
of student loans); Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396-97 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming judgment
denying discharge of student loans for debtor who did not establish each element
of undue hardship). But see In re Hornsby, 144 F.3d 433, 438-39 (6th Cir. 1998)
("In a student-loan discharge case where undue hardship does not exist, but where
facts and circumstances require intervention in the financial burden on the debtor,
an all-or-nothing treatment thwarts the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act.").
116. .In re Hornsby, 144 F.3d at 438-39; see also In re Lawson, 256 B.R.
512, 518 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that the bankruptcy court can modify a
non-dischargeable loan under its Section 105 power); In re Rivers, 213 B.R. 616,
618 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1997) (applying the same exception).
117. See, e.g., Burd v. Walters, 868 F.2d 665, 669 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating
that Section 105 provides a basis for bankruptcy court's civil contempt powers).
118. See, e.g., Bogart, supra note 59, at 815 n.73 ("For example, a
bankruptcy judge may issue a turn over order under [S]ection 542 of the Code that
is ultimately disobeyed by the party to whom the order is directed."); In re Speetee
Group, Inc., 185 B.R. 146, 155 n.15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that Section
105 "empower[s] the bankruptcy court to award sanctions in conjunction with its
inherent powers").
119. William S. Parkinson, The Contempt Power of the Bankruptcy Court
Fact or Fiction: The Debate Continues, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 591, 613-19
(1991). According to Judge Parkinson:
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inherently judicial and cannot constitutionally be vested in a
non-Article III court such as a bankruptcy court, 120 other courts have

suggested that all courts, whether created pursuant to Article I 2or1
Article III of the Constitution, have inherent civil-contempt power.
[C]ontempt matters in bankruptcy cases are directly analogous to
contempts occurring before magistrate judges or administrative law
judges. These agencies are precluded from deciding such matters and
must certify them to a district court for initial adjudication. Given the
bankruptcy court's limited authority to adjudicate only matters arising in
a bankruptcy case, it would be more constitutionally palatable to have the
While one might
bankruptcy court follow a similar procedure.
sympathize with the difficulties presented by limiting use of [Section]
105(a) solely for administrative convenience, the breach of established
constitutional principles in the name of practical expediency is not the
proper means by which to resolve the problem.
Id. at 618-19 (footnotes omitted); see also Manuel L. Leal, The Power of the
Bankruptcy Court: Section 105, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 487, 505-14 (1988) (exploring
bankruptcy courts' ability to exercise contempt power). Judge Leal argues that
contempt powers of a bankruptcy court do not implicate the core proceedings. Id.
at 507-08. He then states:
No contempt power is mentioned in [S]ection 105. Because of the origins
and authority of the bankruptcy court as a creature of Congress, it is
limited by congressional grant. The restrictive approach [to Section 105]
relies upon the legislative ability of Congress to generate a clear
legislative scheme as to the authority of the bankruptcy court. Congress
has not legislatively provided the bankruptcy court with such power. If
the authority to order contempt is to be included in the powers of the
bankruptcy court, it is Congress that must so legislate to provide the
necessary authority.
Id. at 514. Extending Judge Leal's thought, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
9020 (FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020 (1987)), pertaining to and by implication permitting
the entry of contempt orders, is not a congressional action, and can no more serve
as a basis for bankruptcy court contempt powers than does Section 105.
120. See, e.g., In re Haddad, 68 B.R. 944, 946-47 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987)
(discussing cases that hold the bankruptcy courts do not have contempt powers
because it is an inherently judicial power possessed only by Article III courts); In
re Cont'l Air Lines, Inc., 61 B.R. 758, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (holding that issuing a
final contempt order is inconsistent with the constitutional limitations imposed
upon the authority of the bankruptcy courts); In re Indus. Tool Distribs., Inc., 55
B.R. 746, 751-52 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (concluding that delegation of contempt power
to bankruptcy judges is unconstitutional).
121. In re Miller, 81 B.R. 669, 675-76 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
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Some courts have also characterized a bankruptcy court's exercise of
contempt power to enforce a proper order as incidental to Congress's
power to define the right it has created and, thus, as not violating the
constitutionally mandated separation of powers.' 22 Several courts
have found that Section 105 of the Code confers civil contempt
power on bankruptcy judges, 2 3 at least in core proceedings,1 24 or if
contempt power is not excepted from the bankruptcy judges' power
cases and proceedings
under a district court's general order referring
125
to the bankruptcy judges in its district
I.

Limits on the Power ofBankruptcy Courts

Despite the historically broad sanctioning of authority to
bankruptcy courts, after the 2011 United States Supreme Court
decision of Stern v. Marshall, the extent of bankruptcy courts'
jurisdictional authority was seriously put into question. 126 But,
Stern's effect was somewhat diminished by the subsequent Supreme
27
Court decision of Executive Benefits Insurance Co. v. Arkinson.1
122. In re Skinner, 917 F.2d 444, 448-50 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Walters,
868 F.2d 665, 670 (4th Cir. 1989).
123. In re Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Terrebonne Fuel
& Lube, Inc., 108 F.3d 609, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Skinner, 917 F.2d at
447.

124. In re Roush, 88 B.R. 163, 163-64 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (indicating
that bankruptcy courts have the power pursuant to Section 105 to hear and
determine a request for civil contempt emanating from the violation of one of its
orders in a core proceeding); In re Waiters, 868 F.2d 665, 669-70 (4th Cir. 1989);
In re Bowen, 89 B.R. 800, 807 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988); In re Haddad, 68 B.R. at
948.

125. In re Indus. Tool Distribs., 55 B.R. at 749-50.
126. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (removing state
law counterclaims that were not resolved in the claims-allowance process from
core bankruptcy jurisdiction); see generally Jonathan W. Young & Dana G. Hefter,
Creating a Defensible Border: Reasonable Limits on Post-Stern Bankruptcy
Jurisdiction, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July 2013, at 29 (discussing Stern's effect on
bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction).
127. 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2173 (2014) (clarifying Stern by explaining that Stern
did not create a gap rendering courts powerless to act on Stern claims and
requiring district courts to hear these claims in the first instance; instead, Section
157(c) permits courts to proceed with Stern claims, treating them as "non-core"
under the statute); see also Danielle Spinelli & Craig Goldblatt, Constitutionaland
Statutory Limits After Executive Benefits, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2014, at
16-17 (discussing the implications of executive benefits).
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The Court in Stern held that the bankruptcy court's power to
adjudicate "counterclaims to proofs of claim," although statutorily
defined as "core" under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2), was premised on
state law independent of the bankruptcy case and, thus, its final
adjudication by the bankruptcy court was unconstitutional.' 28 Even
though the Stern Court characterized its holding as "narrow," not
intending to call into the question of authority of bankruptcy courts
generally, it has caused lower courts to reexamine whether
bankruptcy courts have the constitutional authority to hear and
decide other statutorily codified "core"
actions under
29
Section 157(b)(2).1 Since Stern, courts have addressed what types
of causes of actions and counterclaims a bankruptcy court may
finally adjudicate without breaching the constitutional restrictions
30
imposed by Article III of the Constitution.'
Wherever the courts ultimately fall regarding bankruptcy
courts' jurisdiction over "core" and "noncore" decisions, the idea
that bankruptcy judges do and should lack the authority of Article III
judges is not new. Professor Thomas Plank has discussed the
constitutional limits inherent within the bankruptcy court system,
and according to Professor Plank:
A summary bankruptcy proceeding makes as
much sense today as it did in 1789. Typically, the
debtor has few liquid assets and many creditors. The
full adjudicatory procedures for resolving a dispute
between two individual litigants is neither useful nor
justified in bankruptcy matters. On the other hand,
bankruptcy judges should not resolve matters that are
not within the realm of bankruptcy. The best way to
keep alive the idea of Congress's limited power to
enact laws on the subject of bankruptcies is to retain
the current system of bankruptcy adjudication of core
128. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.
129. See, e.g., In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., 457 B.R. 299, 308, order aff'd,
2011 WL 6844533 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 23, 2011), aff'd, 2012 WL 2849748 (2d Cir.
2012) ("Unfortunately, Stern v. Marshall has become the mantra of every litigant
who, for strategic or tactical reasons, would rather litigate somewhere other than
the bankruptcy court.").
130. See, e.g., In re Global Technovations Inc., 694 F.3d 705, 722 (6th Cir.
2012) (discussing fraudulent-transfer claims in light of Stern).
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proceedings by bankruptcy judges appointed by and
13
removable by Article III judges. '
IV

CONCLUSION: WHY THE DISCREPANCY?

Bankruptcy courts appear more willing to invoke their all
writs authority under the Code than their Article III counterparts are
willing to invoke their all writs authority under the Act. The only
questions remaining are why and how? Any practicing member of
the federal bar can tell you that the federal district courts in many
jurisdictions are clogged with non-civil proceedings. It could be the
case that in such non-civil proceedings, such as criminal
proceedings, where the preservation of due process is constantly
evaluated and confirmed, federal judges are less likely to stray from
a strict adherence to the United States Code. In contrast, bankruptcy
courts seem willing to do what is necessary to resolve a case both
efficiently and equitably, including invoking their all writs authority
under the Code, perhaps shrouding the exercise of this power in the
cloak of the "doctrine of necessity."' 32 If this is the case, even if all
of the parties to the bankruptcy proceeding are completely content
with bypassing or sidestepping procedure when convenient in favor
of results, there is simply no viable justification other than the
pattern of past practice for such a vast and varying use of the all
writs doctrine in bankruptcy courts, particularly if the underlying
power of bankruptcy judges is unclear.

131.

Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not

Be Article IIIJudges, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567, 639 (1998).
132. See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) ("A 'doctrine
of necessity' is just a fancy name for a power to depart from the Code.").

